requiring drugs to be safe and properly labeled. In 1962, a requirement was introduced for proof of drug efficacy through "adequate and well-controlled investigations," partly in response to the thalidomide tragedy. Rules protecting human-research subjects owe a debt to Tuskegee and Nuremberg. Sometimes it takes a disaster to spur the adoption of appropriate regulation.
Today, compounding pharmacies are at the center of a controversy after a rare outbreak of fungal meningitis that was traced to several lots of the injectable glucocorticoid methylprednisolone acetate compounded by the New England Compounding Center (NECC). Congress is already discussing new federal regulations.
Since 1938, the FDA has had clear authority to regulate drug manufacturing, but compounding falls into a gray area between state and federal oversight. The FDA's authority here is generally limited to reacting to problems identified by others. Traditional compounding pharmacies are not registered with the FDA as drug manufacturers, the agency doesn't approve their prescriptions before marketing, and related adverse events need not be reported to the FDA. State law generally controls recordkeeping, certifications, and licensing for compounding pharmacies (see timeline).
Such a regulatory structure is not unusual: many U.S. health care laws embrace federalism principles, preserving substantial realms for state control. States have primary authority over the practice of both medicine and pharmacy. But over time, compounding has evolved into a business far removed from the mortar and pestle. Once it becomes an industrial-scale national business, the arguments for federal regulation become stronger.
For more than two decades, the FDA has struggled to regulate industrial-scale compounding. In 1992, it issued a Compliance Policy Guide, attempting to police the line between traditional compounding and drug manufacturing. This guide attracted enough criticism that Congress created a safe-harbor compounding statute in 1997, amending the FDCA with a new section, 503A.
But 2 days before this law was to take effect, seven compounding pharmacies sued to block it. Section 503A(c) banned the advertising and promotion of compounded drugs; the theory was that since traditional compounding occurred in response to individual prescriptions, advertising was unnecessary. The advertising ban was the law's Achilles' heel. Compounding drug products that are commercially available in the marketplace or that are essentially copies of commercially available FDA-approved drug products (In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for a pharmacist to compound a small quantity of a drug that is only slightly different from an FDA-approved drug that is commercially available. In these circumstances, the FDA will consider whether there is documentation of the medical need for the particular variation of the compound for the particular patient.)
NECC produced a preservative-free version of a commercially available drug, methylprednisolone acetate
Failing to operate in conformance with applicable state law regulating the practice of pharmacy NECC appears to have violated Massachusetts law
History of FDA Regulation Relevant to Compounding at NECC.

June 25, 1938
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), regulating drug safety and labeling, signed into law.
Oct. 10, 1962
Kefauver-Harris Amendments signed, requiring drug manufacturers to prove efficacy. Compounded drugs do not require FDA premarketing approval.
Early 1990s
FDA begins investigating compounding pharmacies for possible FDCA violations.
March 16, 1992
FDA issues Compliance Policy Guide on compounding, clarifying when compounding becomes illegal drug manufacturing, misbranding, or adulteration.
Nov. 21, 1997
Signing of FDA Modernization Act, whose Section 503A regulates compounding and generally exempts individual compounding from the adulteration, misbranding, and new-drug rules for manufacturers.
Feb. 9, 1998
New England Compounding Pharmacy formed in Mass., doing business as New England Compounding Center (NECC).
Nov. 19, 1998
Seven compounding pharmacies file suit, claiming Section 503A violates their First Amendment rights.
Sept. 16, 1999
Nevada federal district court finds advertising restrictions in Section 503A unconstitutional. FDA appeals.
Feb. 6, 2001
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees advertising restrictions are unconstitutional and cannot be severed from Section 503A. FDA appeals to Supreme Court.
May 29, 2002
FDA reissues 1992 Compliance Policy Guide on compounding, with advertising provisions removed.
Apr. 29, 2002
In Thompson v. Western States, Supreme Court agrees the advertising restrictions are unconstitutional; doesn't address severability; appellate decision stands.
Oct. 23, 2003
Senate holds hearings on compounding; testimony includes reports on compounding pharmacies, finding serious quality problems.
Oct. 2002
FDA receives report of contaminated methylprednisolone acetate. Investigations continue.
April 9, 2002
Mass. and FDA inspectors visit NECC in response to concerns about failure to comply with standards for compounding. First, traditional compounding was limited to a pharmacist or a physician serving a specific patient. Section 503A also permitted compounding of drugs "in limited quantities before the receipt of a valid prescription order . . . based on a history of . . . receiving valid prescription orders." According to the preliminary report from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, NECC far exceeded these limits in preparing and shipping vials of methylprednisolone acetate. 2 Once disconnected from individual patients, compounding increasingly resembles drug manufacturing.
Second, compounding is not needed if a drug is commercially available from an FDA-regulated facility. Section 503A prohibited compounding "regularly or in inordinate amounts" any drugs that were "essentially copies of a commercially available drug product." FDA-approved methylprednisolone acetate is sold by Pfizer and two generics companies, but since NECC's version did not contain preservatives, it could sidestep this regulatory process -with tragic results.
Third, Congress recognized that states could effectively regulate traditional compounding pharmacies, but national-scale businesses required federal coordination. Section 503A provided a test for distinguishing between the two: it limited interstate shipments to no more than 5% of the compounder's business, unless the home state had entered into a "memorandum of understanding" with the FDA, bolstering state and federal cooperation.
NECC shipped substantial quantities of drugs to many states. If Section 503A had not been struck down, both the FDA and Massachusetts would have been more directly involved in regulating NECC for more than a decade.
Yet contamination is only one of five categories of risk associated with compounding pharmacies; the others are subpotency, superpotency, overmedication, and medication replacement. 3 Other policy levers that may be needed include enhanced transparency for state-level regulation, mandatory disclosures to physicians and patients, mandatory reporting of adverse events, user fees to support oversight, clear FDA authority to register and inspect nontraditional compounding pharmacies, enhanced incentives for internal whistleblowers, and modification of reimbursement rules to blunt the economic incentives driving industrial-scale compounding.
Fungal contamination at NECC has sickened more than 400 patients and killed at least 29. But it's important to note that many patients received these sterile inRegulating Compounding Pharmacies after NECC
July 18, 2008
In Medical Center Pharmacy v. Mukasey, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagrees with Ninth Circuit on severability; the balance of Section 503A again in force in Tex., La., and Miss.
Sept. 26, 2012
Mass. begins on-site investigations at NECC. Three lots of methylprednisolone acetate voluntarily recalled.
Oct. 1, 2012
FDA begins on-site inspections at NECC.
Oct. 4, 2012
Voluntary recall expands to all NECC compounded products.
Oct. 26, 2012
FDA releases
Form 483, Inspectional Observations at NECC.
Nov. 1, 2012
VALID Compounding Act, draft legislation for regulating compounding pharmacies, announced.
Oct. 9, 2012
NECC surrenders its Mass. pharmacy license.
Oct. 23, 2012
Mass. releases preliminary report on NECC.
May 21, 2012, to Sept. 18, 2012
NECC prepares several lots of methylprednisolone acetate since linked to fungal contamination.
Sept. 18 2012
Vanderbilt physicians report a case of fungal meningitis associated with sterile injection.
Sept. 24, 2012
Tenn. Dept. of Health informs Mass. Dept. of Public Health about six cases of fungal meningitis tied to NECC methylprednisolone acetate.
Dec. 4, 2006
FDA sends warning letter to NECC alleging multiple violations.
2004
Mass. inspects NECC at least three times, accompanied by FDA at least twice. Mass. report completed in March; proposed consent decree sent to NECC in October.
2007
Draft Senate legislation to regulate compounding is successfully opposed by industry. FDA Amendments Act, signed on September 27, doesn't strengthen compounding regulation.
2006
Mass. settles with NECC without disciplinary action. Second FDA compounding study still finds safety problems. Regulating Compounding Pharmacies after NECC I n almost every country, the proportion of people over 60 years of age is growing faster than any other age group, as a result of longer life expectancy and declining fertility rates. In Europe, the median age is already the highest in the world, and in 2050 there are projected to be 88.5 million Americans 65 years old or older -more than double the 40.3 million in the 2010 census.
Although population aging is a mark of the success of public health policies, it also challenges the established way of implementing such policies. In the case of the European Medicines Agency (EMA), it has prompted an analysis of whether the regulatory system is adapted to taking the needs of older people into account in the development, approval, and use of medications.
The process started in 2006, when the EMA provided an opinion on the adequacy of guidance on the elderly regarding medicinal products. In 2011, the agency's Committee for Human Medicinal Products adopted the EMA geriatric medicines strategy, 1 marking its commitment to improving our understanding of how best to evaluate the benefit-risk ratio for a medication in older patients.
First, the strategy recognizes that older people are the main users of medications -not a minority or special population (a fundamental difference between the geriatric and pediatric populations). Therefore, legislative and regulatory frameworks must be designed to ensure that the use of newly approved medicines in the intended population is supported by relevant data on the benefit-risk balance. The strategy's second aim is to improve the availability of information to patients and prescribers, to support safer use of medications.
Analysis of the data submitted in support of recent applications for marketing authorization shows that the current regulatory environment has ensured reasonable representation of "younger old" patients, but drug-usage patterns reveal a high prevalence of use in "older old" patients (see graph). Patients who are 75 years old or older often present a complex picture involving coexisting conditions and frailty: they are the fastest-growing demographic group but are largely underrepresented in clinical trials given their disproportionately high actual use of drugs. This imbalance will make it increasingly difficult and potentially inappropriate to extrapolate data to these patients. 2 Though trials are less likely to set unjustified age limits than they were a few decades ago, this improvement must be considered in the context of a rapidly aging population and the continued widespread use of exclusion criteria based on coexisting conditions. Corrective efforts must be maintained to ensure that a representative population of patients covering the entire age range is studied in the preauthorization phase, in accordance with international guidelines. 3 Chronologic age alone is inadequate for characterizing the population enrolled in a clinical trial. Frailty is a predictor of clinical outcomes, 4 and the reduction of frailty has benefits for individuals and society. The EMA is exploring the possibility of reaching a consensus on an operational definition of frailty and tools for evaluating it that could be used for clinical research and to guide therapeutic decisions.
Medications commonly prescribed to treat other conditions jections for back and joint pain, a procedure that lacks high-quality evidence of efficacy. 4, 5 These problems cannot be laid entirely at the feet of compounders when clinicians persist in clinical practices despite weak evidence of efficacy.
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